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 The FAA vs. the NLRA and the 
FLSA: Have Courts Given the FAA 
Too Much Deference? 
NIKKI CLARK* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When two parties willingly enter into an agreement with one another, each 
party is generally expected to abide by that agreement.  This was not always the 
case with arbitration agreements so Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) on February 12, 1925 in response to judicial hostility against arbitration.1  
The FAA was ratified to provide validity to arbitration agreements into which par-
ties had willingly entered.2  Initially, supporters of the FAA stated the Act was de-
signed to cover contracts between people in different states who shipped, bought, 
or sold commodities.3  While this was the original intention of the Act, courts have 
since given the FAA more weight.4  Since the passage of the FAA, courts have 
favored arbitration agreements and have generally given deference to arbitration 
awards and decisions.5 
Section 1 of the FAA states “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts 
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”6  In 2001, the United States Supreme 
Court held the employment contract exclusion only applied to contracts of interstate 
transportation workers, abrogating the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Craft v. Campbell 
Soup Co.,7 which opined that all employment contracts were exempt from the 
FAA.8 
The FAA started out as an attempt to give weight to arbitration agreements, but 
now the reach of the FAA has extended beyond the commercial claims it was in-
tended to cover.  The right to arbitrate claims has become a substantive right.  The 
current concern is AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion established that the FAA preempts 
state laws prohibiting consumer contracts from disallowing class-wide arbitration.9  
Concepcion gave even more weight to the FAA by holding it preempts state laws, 
giving rise to the possibility of the FAA displacing federal laws particularly in the 
context of employment contracts.  This Comment will discuss whether courts have 
                                                          
* B.A., Arkansas State University 2014, J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law 2017. I 
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 1. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 2. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985). 
 3. Id. at 625-26. 
 4. Case Comment, Deference and the Federal Arbitration Act: The NLRB’s Determination of Sub-
stantive Statutory Rights, 128 HARV. L. REV. 907, 907 (2014). 
 5. Id. 
 6. 9 U.S.C § 1 (2012). 
 7. Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 8. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001). 
 9. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011). 
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given too much weight to the FAA at the cost of making other federal laws such as 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
less effective.  The NLRA and the FLSA are not the only federal laws that stand to 
be affected by the expanding application of the FAA. The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) has also been affected by the FAA. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Courts have increasingly expanded the application of the FAA.  Initially the 
FAA made arbitration agreements between parties enforceable; but recently, in 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the United States Supreme Court held the FAA 
preempts state laws that prohibit contracts from disallowing class-wide arbitra-
tion.10  The Court has yet to accept a case that addresses the issue of whether the 
FAA supersedes other federal laws.  However, other federal courts have specifically 
addressed whether the FAA supersedes the NLRA or the FLSA.  Giving more def-
erence to the FAA affects both the NLRA and the FLSA, but in different ways.  The 
NLRA allows employees to engage in concerted activity and the FAA could prevent 
employees from exercising a statutory right.  The FLSA provides that engaging in 
class action is a right. Federal courts have primarily held that mandatory arbitration 
does not deprive individuals of their right to class action, but limits the forum in 
which those rights can be enforced.  This section will discuss the NLRA and the 
FLSA how federal courts have addressed those laws when the FAA is also at issue. 
A. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion 
Concepcion is a very important case because it recently expanded the applica-
tion of the FAA by preempting state laws that prohibit states from disallowing class-
wide arbitration.11  In 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion signed a contract for 
cellphone service with AT&T Mobility.12  This contract included an arbitration 
agreement that required all claims be brought individually and not as a class.13  
When the Concepcions purchased service, the advertisement for phones stated that 
the phones were free, but the Concepcions were charged the sales tax for the 
phones.14  In March 2006, the Concepcions filed a complaint, which was later con-
solidated with a putative class action.15  AT&T moved to compel arbitration.16  The 
District Court denied the motion relying on California Supreme Court’s decision in 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, which held a waiver of class arbitration in a con-
sumer contract of adhesion is per se unconscionable.17  The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court finding the arbitration was per se unconscionable.18 
                                                          
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 336. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 337 
 15. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337.. 
 16. Id. at 338. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding when a state law prohibits 
arbitration of a particular type of claim, the FAA displaces the conflicting rule.19  
The Court listed three reasons why the FAA preempted state laws that prohibit ar-
bitration.20  First, class arbitration disrupts the informality of arbitration, slowing 
down the process and making it more costly.21   When arbitration is bilateral, each 
party forgoes procedural rigor and appellate review for private dispute resolution, 
which includes lower costs, speed and efficiency, and the ability to choose expert 
adjudicators.22  Second, class arbitration requires procedural formality.23  Arbitra-
tion proceedings are less formal and if procedures are too informal, absent members 
would not be bound by the arbitration.24  For a class action decision to bind absent 
class-members, such parties must be adequately represented and that would not oc-
cur in class arbitration.25  Third, class arbitration increases the risks to defendants.26  
While individual defendants may be willing to accept the costs of errors in arbitra-
tion, when damages are owed to thousands of potential claimants, those errors be-
come devastating.27 
B.  National Labor Relations Act 
The National Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935 to protect private sector 
employees.28  The Act allowed for employee representation in collective bargaining 
and protected employee rights to engage in concerted activity.29  The Act also es-
tablished the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to implement its policies.30  
Since 1935, the NLRA has been amended twice. In 1947, the Labor Management 
Relations Act, better known as the Taft-Hartley Act, limited the power and activities 
of labor unions.31  Previously, the Act only prohibited unfair labor practices of em-
ployers.32  Under the Taft-Hartley Act, unfair labor practices such as mass picket-
ing, jurisdictional strikes, and political strikes were not allowed.33 The NLRA was 
amended again in 1959, this time by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act, also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act.34  The Landrum-Griffin Act reg-
ulates the internal affairs of labor unions and the relationship between the unions 
and employers.35  The Act requires unions to hold secret elections for all local of-
fices and gives the United States Department of Labor the power to review claims 
of improper election activity.36 
                                                          
 19. Id. at 341. 
 20. Id. at 348-51. 
 21. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 349. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 349. 
 28. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
 29. Id. 
 30. 29 U.S.C § 153 (2012). 
 31. Labor Management Relation (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a). 29 U.S.C § 185(a) (2012). 
 32. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
 33. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2012). 
 34. 29 U.S.C. 401 (2012). 
 35. Id. 
 36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-82 (2012). 
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The following cases discuss how the NLRB has addressed the issue of the 
NLRA and the FAA.  D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB was an important decision because 
it was seen as an attempt by the NLRB to stop efforts by employers to reduce their 
risk of class action claims.37  However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
this decision.38  The Fifth Circuit reached the same decision in Murphy Oil v. 
NLRB.39  In Totten v. Kellogg Brown and Root LLC, the United States District for 
the Central District of California opted not to follow the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
finding proceeding in a class action was a remedy.40 
i. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB 
D.R. Horton is a home-builder with operations in over twenty states.41  Begin-
ning in 2006, Horton required new and existing employees to sign a Mutual Arbi-
tration Agreement.42  This agreement stated all employees “voluntarily waive all 
rights to trial in court before a judge or jury on all claims between them” and all 
claims would be settled through arbitration and precluded employees from consol-
idating claims with each other.43  Michael Cuda, a Horton superintendent from July 
2005 to 2006, sought to initiate arbitration of a consolidated claim with other simi-
larly situated superintendents that Horton had misclassified as exempt from statu-
tory overtime protections in violation of the FLSA.44  Horton told Cuda that the 
Mutual Arbitration Agreement did not allow for collective claims.45  Cuda then filed 
a claim alleging the class action waiver violated the NLRA.46 
On January 3, 2011, an administrative law judge held that the agreement vio-
lated sections 8(a)(1) and (4) of the NLRA because it would lead employees to be-
lieve they could not file unfair labor practice charges with the Board.47  On January 
3, 2012, the Board upheld the administrative judge’s decision and held that the ar-
bitration agreement violated 8(a)(1) because it required employees to waive their 
right to collective actions in any forum.48  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the FAA does not deny a party any statutory right and that even if it did; the 
use of class action procedures is not a substantive right, but a procedural right.49 
                                                          
 37. Holland, Hart LLP, Will Arbitration Agreements Barring Class Claims Become the Norm?, 18 
NO. 10 MONT. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2013). 
 38. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 361 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 39. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 40. Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1260 (C.D. Cal.2016). 
 41. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 348. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 349. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 349. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 357. 
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ii. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB 
Murphy Oil USA operates retail gas stations in multiple states.50  Sheila Hob-
son began working for Murphy Oil in Alabama in 2008.51  Hobson signed an arbi-
tration agreement, which stated that all claims between employees and Murphy Oil 
would be resolved through arbitration.52  Hobson and three other employees filed a 
collective action against Murphy Oil in the federal district court in 2010 alleging 
Murphy Oil had violated the FLSA.53  Murphy Oil filed a motion to compel arbi-
tration.54  While the motion to dismiss was pending, Hobson filed an unfair labor 
charge.55  The Board held that Murphy Oil violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by 
requiring employees to sign an arbitration agreement waiving their right to pursue 
class and collective claims in all forums.56  In 2012, the district court stayed the 
FLSA collective action and compelled employees to submit claims to arbitration.57  
At the same time, the petition for review of the Board’s decision reached the Fifth 
Circuit.58  The Fifth Circuit held that the Board should have applied its decision in 
D.R. Horton.59  Had the Board applied the Fifth Circuit’s decision in D.R. Horton, 
they would have reached the same decision that the Fifth Circuit reached.60 
iii. Totten v. Kellogg Brown and Root LLC 
David Totten began working for Kellogg Brown and Root LLC in January 
2012.61  During hiring orientation, Totten signed Kellogg Brown’s Dispute Resolu-
tion Program (DRP) as a condition of employment.62  The DRP required employees 
to arbitrate all claims against Kellogg Brown.63  Kellogg Brown fired Totten in June 
2014.64  Totten filed a class action suit on July 22, 2014, alleging that Kellogg 
Brown failed to pay its employees the minimum wage and failed to provide accurate 
wage statements for its employees.65  Kellogg Brown filed a motion to compel ar-
bitration under the DRP.66  Totten argued that the arbitration agreement was unen-
forceable because the class action waiver interfered with his right to engage in con-
certed action under the NLRA.67  The court looked to D.R. Horton in its analysis of 
whether the arbitration agreement was unenforceable.68  The district court disagreed 
with the decision in D.R. Horton and found that the right to a class action suit in 
                                                          
 50. Murphy Oil USA v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1016. 
 56. Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1016. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1248 (C.D. Cal.2016). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1249. 
 65. Id. at 1247. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Totten, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 1254. 
 68. Id. at 1256. 
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section 7 of the NLRA is a substantive non-waivable right.69  Section 7 protects the 
right of employees to engage in concerted activity for the purposes of collective 
bargaining.70  The court found that proceeding in a class action constituted a con-
certed activity under the NLRA.71 
C.  Fair Labor Standards Act 
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was passed in 1938.72  It set the national 
minimum wage, provided time-and-a-half pay for overtime, and limited the em-
ployment of minors.73  The purpose of the FLSA was to ensure that employees were 
protected from unfair practices by employers and could maintain “the minimum 
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being.”74 
Individuals who are considered employees under the FLSA are afforded certain 
remedies when their rights have been violated.75  Class actions are one of those 
remedies.76  Currently, six federal circuits have held that the statutory right to class 
action suits in employment contracts can be waived: First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, 
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.77 
i. First Circuit: Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp.78 
Joseph Skirchak and Barry Aldrich, employees of a government contractor of 
technology services called DRC, filed a class action suit alleging the company had 
violated the FLSA by not paying employees time-and-a-half for time worked be-
yond forty hours per week.79  DRC filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to 
its 2003 Dispute Resolution Program.80  The district court ordered arbitration but 
struck the part of the program that disallowed class actions.81  The court found that 
under the FLSA, a class action waiver does not have to be knowing and voluntary 
as it does under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).82 
ii. Second Circuit: Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP83 
Stephanie Sutherland was employed at Ernst & Young from 2008 to 2009.84  
When Sutherland began working, she signed an offer letter containing an arbitration 
                                                          
 69. Id. at 1260. 
 70. Id. at 1261. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
 73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207, 212 (2012). 
 74. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 561 U.S. 1, 11 (2011). 
 75. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Amelia W. Koch, Jennifer McNamara & Laura E. Carlisle, Individualizing the FLSA: Collective 
Action Waivers and the Split in the Federal Courts, 13 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 
99, 104 (2012). See infra pp. 8-11. 
 78. Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 79. Id. at 52 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 57. 
 83. Sutherland v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2nd Cir. 2013). 
 84. Id. at 293. 
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agreement with a class action waiver.85  Sutherland filed a class action suit, alleging 
Ernst & Young had incorrectly classified her as exempt from the overtime require-
ments of the FLSA.86  Ernst & Young moved to compel arbitration and the district 
court denied the motion.87  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that an em-
ployee can waive the right to pursue a class action suit under the FLSA, citing AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion to show class actions can be waived.88 
iii. Fourth Circuit: Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc.89 
Labor Ready was a temporary employment agency that provided manual day 
labor to different companies throughout the country.90  Employees would report to 
the Labor Ready office at the beginning of each workday and would remain until 
they received a job assignment.91  At the end of each workday, employees would 
return to the office where they would receive payment for their work.92  Curtis Ad-
kins filed a class action suit alleging that the payroll procedures violated the 
FLSA.93  Adkins claimed that the employees should be compensated for the travel 
time to get to the office and for the time spent waiting until employees received 
work assignments.94  If those hours were added to the employees’ paychecks, many 
would also be entitled to overtime.95  Labor Ready filed a motion to compel arbi-
tration, and the district court granted the motion.96  Adkins appealed, arguing that 
the arbitration agreement included in the employment contract contained a waiver 
of class actions, making the cost of pursuing litigation extremely high.97  The Fourth 
Circuit Court found that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable because 
the plaintiff could not show that the waiver of class action would result in higher 
costs of arbitration.98 
iv. Fifth Circuit: Carter v. Countrywide Credit Industries99 
Employees of Countrywide Credit, which sold and serviced consumer mort-
gage loans, filed a class action suit against Countrywide, alleging that their em-
ployer did not pay the appropriate overtime pay guaranteed under the FLSA.100  
Countrywide filed a motion to compel arbitration as its employment contracts man-
dated arbitration agreements as a condition of employment.101  The district court 
                                                          
 85. Id. at 293-94. 
 86. Id. at 294. 
 87. Id. at 294-95. 
 88. Id. at 297. 
 89. Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 499 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 90. Id. at 499. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Adkins,303 F.3d at 499. 
 96. Id. at 500. 
 97. Id. at 502. 
 98. Id. at 502-03. 
 99. Carter v. Countrywide Credit Industries, 362 F.3d 294 (5th. Cir. 2004). 
 100. Id. at 296. 
 101. Id. 
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granted the motion, and the plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the arbitration agree-
ment was unconscionable because it disallowed class actions.102  The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the arbitration agreements were not unconscionable, be-
cause the only provision that was unreasonable was the fee splitting arrangement, 
which had already been severed by the district court.103 
v. Eighth Circuit: Owen v. Bristol Care104 
Bristol Care operates residential-care facilities for elderly patients.105  Sharon 
Owen was hired as an administrator at the Cameron, Missouri facility in 2009.106  
When she was hired, Owen signed a Mandatory Arbitration Agreement that con-
tained a class action waiver.107  The arbitration agreement applied to claims brought 
under the FLSA.108  In 2011, Owen brought suit on behalf of herself and other sim-
ilarly situated employees, alleging that Bristol Care misclassified certain employees 
as exempt for the purposes of overtime laws.109  Bristol Care filed a motion to com-
pel arbitration and the district court denied the motion.110  The court found that 
nothing in the text of the FLSA barred employees from agreeing to arbitrate FLSA 
claims individually and a conflict did not exist between the FLSA and the FAA.111 
vi. Eleventh Circuit: Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.112 
In 2002, Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation adopted a dispute resolution pol-
icy.113  Gulfstream mailed a copy of the policy to all its employees and posted copies 
on the company intranet.114  The policy included an arbitration clause that prohib-
ited class actions.115  Current and former employees of Gulfstream subsequently 
filed a class action suit alleging Gulfstream did not pay the required overtime pay 
under the FLSA.116  Gulfstream moved to compel arbitration.117  The district court 
denied the motion.118  The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision 
finding that the dispute resolution policy was not unconscionable because of the 
class action waiver.119  The waiver of class action was “part and parcel of arbitra-
tion’s ability to offer simplicity, informality, and expedition.”120 
                                                          
 102. Id. at 298. 
 103. Id. at 301. 
 104. Owen v. Bristol Care, 702 F.3d 1050 (8th. Cir. 2013) 
 105. Id. at 1051. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Owen, 702 F.3d at 1051. 
 111. Id. at 1052. 
 112. Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2005) 
 113. Id. at 1364. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1365. 
 116. Id. at 1366. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Caley, 428 F.3d at 1367. 
 119. Id. at 1378. 
 120. Id. 
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D. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation and the ADEA 
While the focus of this Comment is the effect that increased deference has on 
the NLRA and the FLSA, the NLRA and the FLSA are not the only federal laws 
that stand to be affected by the FAA.  The following case discusses the ADEA.  
Robert Gilmer was hired by Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation (Interstate) in 
1981.121  As a part of his employment, Gilmer was required to register as a securities 
representative, which provided that Gilmer “agreed to arbitrate any dispute, claim 
or controversy” arising out of Gilmer’s employment or termination of employ-
ment.122  In 1987, Interstate fired Gilmer.123  Gilmer was 62 at the time and believing 
he was fired because of his age, Gilmer brought suit alleging violation of the 
ADEA.124  Interstate filed a motion to compel arbitration.125  The district court de-
nied the motion, but the Fourth Circuit reversed the denial, finding that nothing in 
the ADEA indicated a congressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.126  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a 
circuit split concerning the arbitrability of ADEA claims.127  The Court held that 
statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursu-
ant to the FAA, and that while all statutory claims may not be appropriate for arbi-
tration, “having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless 
Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies 
for the statutory rights at issue.128 
III. COMMENT 
Congress passed the FAA with the intention of making sure arbitration agree-
ments that parties had entered into willingly were enforced.129  The United States 
Supreme Court has urged lower courts to enforce arbitration agreements under the 
FAA.130  While arbitration has its advantages, courts have recently given more def-
erence to the FAA.  In Concepcion, the United States Supreme Court decided that 
the FAA preempts state laws that prohibit class action waivers in arbitration agree-
ments.131  The question courts now face is whether the FAA supersedes other federal 
laws.  Currently, federal courts have found that the FAA is controlling when the 
statutory rights to bring class action under the NLRA and the FLSA and the FAA 
are at issue.132  The two major concerns with the increased deference given to FAA 
are the limited judicial review and the loss of substantive rights. 
                                                          
 121. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 23-24. 
 125. Id. at 24. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24. 
 128. Id. at 26. 
 129. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985). 
 130. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. 
 131. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 331, 341 (2011). 
 132. See, e.g., D.R. Horton v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 
726 F.3d 290 (2nd Cir. 2013). 
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The first major concern with the amount of deference given to the FAA and the 
preemption of other federal laws is the limited judicial review that arbitration deci-
sions receive.  Arbitration decisions are not subject to judicial review by federal 
courts unless they are in “manifest disregard of the law.”133  However, the United 
States Supreme Court has not expressly defined this phrase.134  Furthermore, be-
cause the Court has not expressly defined the standard, lower courts have applied a 
limited reading of this standard.135  This means that an arbitration award may not 
be overturned if the arbitrator misapplied or misunderstood the law.136  The Fifth 
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit are the only two circuits that have held that the manifest 
disregard of the law standard requires an arbitrator to apply the correct law.137 
For other circuits, an arbitration decision will only be overturned for manifest 
disregard of the law if the law is clear and unambiguous, if the arbitrator knew of 
the law, and if the arbitrator knowingly misapplied the law.138  The burden of proof 
is on the plaintiff to prove that an arbitration decision is in manifest disregard of the 
law.139  This is an extremely high burden for a plaintiff to prove considering only 
two circuits require an arbitrator to correctly apply the law and considering that 
many arbitration agreements are presented in a take-it-or-leave-it manner. 
Arbitration agreements are usually a condition of employment for most em-
ployers.  When employees challenge the validity of arbitration agreements, many 
are challenged under state unconscionability law.  This results in inconsistent rul-
ings, with some courts requiring employees to bring their claims before an arbitrator 
and with other courts allowing employees to proceed through the federal courts.  As 
arbitration proceedings are less formal and not held to the same standard as federal 
judicial proceedings, allowing the FAA increased deference does more harm than 
good.  Often employees must sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of their 
employment and in most circuits, an arbitrator is not even required to correctly ap-
ply the law.  If the FAA were to displace the NLRA and the FLSA and individual 
employees proceed through arbitration, employees have absolutely no remedy if an 
arbitration decision is reached in error. 
Another major concern that comes with increased deference and the inevitable 
preemption of other federal laws by the FAA is that employees are faced with the 
loss of substantive rights. Both the NLRA and the FLSA allow employees to pro-
ceed through litigation as a class.  Proceeding in a class action suit is a remedy 
provided by both federal statutes but in different forms.  The NLRA protects an 
employee’s right to engage in concerted activity; pursuing a claim through a class 
action suit is a protected concerted activity.  Under the FLSA, employees can pursue 
a class action suit as remedy for violation of FLSA.  The FAA limits the forum in 
which employees can use this remedy provided to them.  Circuits are divided on 
whether employees can waive their right to a class action suit under the FLSA and 
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whether section 7 protects the right to a class action suit under the NLRA.140  The 
United States Supreme Court has not addressed either issue.  Allowing the FAA to 
preempt other federal laws eliminates a statutory remedy that is provided for em-
ployees. 
There are many arguments as to why deference is given to the FAA and to 
arbitration.  One argument is that arbitration provides a less expensive and quicker 
alternative to litigation and allowing class arbitration slows down arbitration pro-
ceedings, thus undermining the expediency that otherwise makes arbitration prefer-
able.  While arbitration proceedings are a quicker alternative to full-scale litigation, 
the problem with this argument is that it causes the employee to give up a statutory 
right so that the employer can resolve its issues more efficiently.  This contradicts 
the intent behind the NLRA and the FLSA, both of which were passed to protect 
the employee.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that while efficiency is a 
worthy state interest, there are higher values than speed and efficiency.141 
Another argument in favor of deference to the FAA is that because arbitration 
is quicker and less expensive than litigation, the FAA and other federal laws may 
not be able to coexist together.  The NLRA and the FAA provide a remedy, the class 
action, which many argue slows down arbitration or make it more expensive.  The 
FAA’s preemption power has a limit.  It does not require the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements on “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.”142  In J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, the United States Supreme Court held 
that an employee cannot waive the benefits of the NLRA.143  Under section 7 of the 
NLRA, class actions are a remedy for employees engaged in concerted activities.144  
Under both the NLRA and the FAA, an employer could still resolve issues with its 
employees through arbitration, and employees can still proceed as a class.  Class 
actions are also a remedy under the FLSA.145  Employers can still resolve issues 
through arbitration, and employees can still proceed as a class. Class actions also 
provide benefits to employees.  Through class actions, employees can bring a case 
on behalf of themselves and others that they may otherwise not have able to afford. 
Proceeding as an individual, an employee would receive fewer damages than if pro-
ceeding as a class.  Class actions also help employers as well.  While they run the 
risk of paying more damages in a class action, they do not have to worry about 
having multiple trials for each individual aggrieved employee. 
The NLRA and the FLSA are not the only federal laws that are threatened by 
the favoritism shown to the FAA.  The ADEA and the Americans with Disability 
Act (ADA) both stand to be affected.  In Gilmer, the United States Supreme Court 
found that if parties agree to arbitrate claims, then those claims should proceed 
                                                          
 140. See, e.g., D.R. Horton v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (2013) (holding the FAA does not deny a party 
any statutory right and that even if it did, the use of class action procedures is not a substantive right, but 
a procedural right). But see, e.g., Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1254-55 
(C.D. Cal.2016) (holding Section 7 protects the right of employees to engage in concerted activity for 
the purposes of collective bargaining and proceeding in a class action is concerted activity for purposes 
of the NLRA). See, e.g., Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2nd Cir. 2013) (holding that 
an employee can waive the right to pursue a class action under the FLSA, citing AT&T Mobility v. Con-
cepcion to show class actions can be waived). 
 141. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). 
 142. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348. 
 143. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 336 (1944). 
 144. Totten, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 1261. 
 145. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). 
11
Clark: The FAA vs. the NLRA and the FLSA: Have Courts Given the FAA Too
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
510 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2016 
through arbitration even if they are inappropriate for arbitration.146  The implica-
tions of this decision are far-reaching.  The Court’s analysis was not based on 
whether an employee was faced with the loss of substantive rights, but whether 
there was congressional intent in the ADEA to preclude enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.147 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While the intent of the FAA was to give greater weight to arbitration agree-
ments in the face of judicial hostility, courts have since given extensive weight and 
deference to the FAA.  The United States Supreme Court has already held that the 
FAA preempts some state laws, but the deference given to the FAA is beginning to 
preempt other federal laws as well.  The increased deference given to the FAA has 
begun to eliminate key components of both the NLRA and the FLSA.  The NLRA 
and the FLSA can coexist alongside of the FAA without compromising either and 
it is important for employee protection that the remedies set out in the NLRA and 
the FLSA are protected with equal vigor. 
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